Assignments vs. Liens In the Personal Injury Context

A large number of people, attorneys included, don’t know the difference between “assignments” and “liens.”

Why does it matter, you ask? For a number of reasons that will be more obvious when the difference is understood.

An assignment is the easier of the two to understand since, as the name implies, it is an transfer of all or some rights or property to a third-party. Although an assignor cannot ever assign more rights or property than it holds, it can assign less than all of the rights or property subject to the assignment.

An assignment is bears the hallmarks of ownership. That is, an assignee steps into the assignor’s shoes and has the ability to control the rights or property subject to the assignment. This means that the assignee can further assign the rights or property, can sell them, donate them, pledge them as collateral or simply enjoy the rights or property as though they were his or her own; subject, of course, to restrictions in the assignment agreement.

Here is where it will get tricky: an assignment can, in effect, extinguish an obligation to one party by transferring the obligation to another party.

Take, for example, a debt. Assume you owe a friend $10,000 for a car that you bought from him, and you agree to pay it of at a rate of $1,000 a year for 10 years. After two years, however, your friend decides that he really needs money and so he assigns the remaining $8,000 debt to me for $5,000 immediate cash. The debt to your friend is now, in effect, extinguished and transferred to me – that is, you owe me the $8,000.

You may not realize it, but a personal injury claim is a bundle of property rights, and to make matters a little more confusing, some states prohibit assignment of personal injury claims. Now, understand, this is a seemingly narrow restriction and assignment of other rights (such as debts) and property (such as cars) are fully assignable in every state.

What this anti-assignment law in the personal injury context means is that you cannot assign to someone a claim for bodily injury to a third-party. Remember, you can still assign the part of the case that corresponds to property damage, such as damage to your vehicle or personal belongings, and you can still assign any non-bodily injury claims, such as breach of contract or bad-faith.

Now keep that all in mind. What is a lien?

A lien is “[a] charge or encumbrance upon property to secure the payment or performance of a debt, duty or other obligation,” and it “is distinct from the obligation which it secures.” Matlow v. Matlow, 89 Ariz. 293, 297-98, 361 P.2d 648, 651 (1961) (citing 53 C.J.S. Liens § 1, at 826). In Arizona, a lien can be created by statute, but an equitable lien may also arise from an express contract if the parties indicate an attempt to charge particular property as security for an obligation. Kalmanoff v. Weitz, 8 Ariz.App. 171, 172, 444 P.2d 728 (1968).

Unlike assignments, there is no prohibition on liens against personal injury cases, but this subject matter creates a great deal of confusion. Admittedly, what has contributed to the confusion is that the law has undergone centuries of perversion and that it is sometimes hard to tell the difference between an assignment versus a lien on a personal injury claim.

The courts examining this issue have often overlooked the distinction and, typically, have incorrectly deemed simple liens to be prohibited assignments without examining the real character of the transaction. To be sure, there are decisions that uphold standard (non-statutory) medical liens between a doctor and patient for services, and opinions which preclude insurance companies from recouping payment made to those same doctors as being impermissible assignments. These decisions are irreconcilable and fail to appreciate the difference between an assignment versus a lien on a personal injury claim.

Simply put, such arrangements – e.g., where someone is due money for services rendered – are permissible liens on a personal injury claims. That is, where an injured person owes money to a third-party and agrees to secure the debt with an encumbrance upon proceeds in a personal injury claim, the third-party does not own or control the personal injury claim (as they would had there been an assignment) and the personal injury claim remains “distinct from the obligation which it secures.” The third-party has no say in how the claim is handled, does not need to assent to the settlement of the claim and will not be a party to signing a release of such a claim, which would be hallmarks of an assignment. To the contrary, if the injured party loses the personal injury suit, the “distinct . . . obligation” remains and must still be satisfied (absent an agreement making the debt or obligation contingent upon an event, such as prevailing in a personal injury action). In contrast, assignment of a losing claim would always result in an assignee receiving nothing (with the obligation having been extinguished upon the assignment).

Due to the anti-assignment case law, which is inconsistently applied, this causes confusion in personal injury cases. Although we are not going to ever resolve the issue here, it helps to remember the reason for anti-assignment law in the personal injury context is to prevent “trafficking in personal injury claims.” That is, the courts long ago decided that it was not acceptable for people to market in buying and selling personal injury actions, ostensibly because of the unsavory possibilities of having injured people victimized by those wishing to purchase such rights. In reality, it has more to do with the image of justice and the likelihood that it would encourage fraudulent personal injury claims.

Ironically, the quiet exception to the rule prohibiting assignment of personal injury claims is that attorneys are permitted to take contingency fees on personal injury claims, which (if you believe what you read about other so-called impermissible assignment arrangements) is nothing more than an assignment of a personal injury claim. It used to be that such arrangements were considered impermissible, but after many years the courts relented an allowed contingency fee arrangements in all but criminal and divorce proceedings. In those cases, courts still felt that there was too must risk to allowing contingency fees — that contingency fees would encourage unethical or unsavory conduct in criminal and divorce cases.

The reason contingency fees are allowed to attorneys, however, is to open the door to parties who would not otherwise be able to afford paying for attorneys on an hourly basis. And, most often, the same reason underlies lien arrangements for injured persons, whether it be health insurance liens, contractual doctors liens, liens for pharmaceutical expenses, liens for rental cars or liens for cash advanced to pay bills. Accordingly, although courts have long misunderstood and confused the difference between impermissible assignments and permissible liens, the simple fact is that such liens are a necessary element in modern personal injury practice to provide immediate care and compensation to impecunious injured parties who cannot afford to battle for years with an insurer for a tortfeasor. Such arrangements to not give rise to the concerns underlying the old anti-assignment laws and, in fact, do not reveal ownership characteristics of assignments.